When Is the Use of Foreign Law Possible? A Hard Case: The Protection of Privacy in Europe and the United States by Gordley, James
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 67 | Number 4
Symposium: Law Making in a Global World
Summer 2007
When Is the Use of Foreign Law Possible? A Hard
Case: The Protection of Privacy in Europe and the
United States
James Gordley
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
James Gordley, When Is the Use of Foreign Law Possible? A Hard Case: The Protection of Privacy in Europe and the United States, 67 La. L.
Rev. (2007)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol67/iss4/5
When Is the Use of Foreign Law Possible? A Hard
Case: The Protection of Privacy in Europe and the
United States
James Gordley*
I. INTRODUCTION
No one thinks it odd that a Minnesota court should be guided
by a decision in Wisconsin. The reason, some might say, is that
Minnesota and Wisconsin are both applying the same system of
legal rules: the common law. The meaning of a rule is shaped by
its place in the larger system of rules and by the traditions that
formed that system. If that is so, one might expect little guidance
by looking to the rules of a foreign legal system.
Instead, however, one might think a Minnesota court should
consult a Wisconsin decision simply because both courts are facing
the same problem. History and tradition might explain why the
problem happens to be the same, but so long as it is, Minnesota
judges should care about what those in Wisconsin do for the same
reason that engineers at Boeing should care about what engineers
at Airbus do. There is no one right way to design an airplane.
Each design may have advantages and disadvantages. In the end,
the engineers at Boeing may make a different trade-off between
fuel economy and speed, or capacity and comfort, than those at
Airbus, but they are still facing a common problem and will
understand the trade-offs better if they know what each other is
doing.
Elsewhere, I have argued that even when one compares the
private law of common and civil law systems, most of the
problems are similar.1 The differences in laws represent a range of
possible solutions. When that is so, it seems clear that jurists in
one country should be guided by what those in other countries do.
That is so even when, as in the building of airplanes, there is no
single right solution, and when there are different possible ways to
trade off advantages and disadvantages.
In this article, I would like to show why jurists in different
legal systems should seek each other's guidance even when
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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discrepancies in their law are glaring. The most glaring of all,
perhaps, is the protection granted to honor, dignity, and reputation.
The French protected this right since the nineteenth century, the
Germans since 1954-and only then, their courts claimed, because
their new democratic Constitution spoke of the "worth" of a human
being. The English have protected such rights only recently and
then, supposedly, because of a "breach of confidence." American
courts have reached results unthinkable in France or Germany. For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a magazine has a
constitutional right to ridicule a public figure grossly and
obscenely,2 and to release the name of a rape victim while her
assailant is still at large.3 In France, in contrast, a journalist was
held liable for writing an article that called a television
commentator a "kosher pork butcher.' 4 A newspaper was held
liable for revealing that a judge had taken a vacation for "nervous
depression." 5  In Germany, the German army and its soldiers
recovered when a journalist called the army a "murder machine.",6
The wife of a Hohenzollern recovered for publicity given to her
divorce.
7
We will consider three reasons why the law in these countries
might simply not be comparable, in which event one country could
not learn from or be guided by the law of another. First, rules
protecting honor, dignity, and reputation might have meaning only
in relation to other rules of the same national legal system. If that
is so, even jurists in civil law countries such as France and
Germany could not seek guidance from each other's law since each
has a different system of law embodied in its own national code.
A second reason is that one could not compare common law
rules protecting honor, dignity, and reputation with those of civil
law jurisdictions such as France and Germany. The traditions are
too different; consequently, the jurists of one system could not
seek guidance from those of the other.
A third reason is that the United States is different. Because of
its unique traditions, it faces problems different from those of other
nations. A look at other nations' laws would not be helpful.
Any one of these reasons could explain why the protection of
honor, dignity, and reputation is different in the United States than
it is elsewhere. Moreover, any one of them could explain why
2. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
3. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
4. Cour d'appel, Paris, 15 Feb. 1988, J.C.P. 1988, II, 2111.
5. Cass., 2' ch. civ., 27 Apr. 1988, pourvoi no. 86-13.303 (retrieved from
Lexis data bank).
6. Bundesgerichtshof, 19 Jan. 1989, JZ 1989, 644.
7. Oberlandesgericht, Hamburg, 26 Mar. 1970, NJW 1970, 1325.
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jurists in some nations could not learn from the law of others.
Their problems would be so different that it would not be like
Boeing learning from Airbus. It would be like Boeing trying to
learn from Yamaha.
My claim is that if we examine each of these possibilities in
turn, we will see that most often, the problems are the same. That
does not mean the answers should be. It does mean we can learn
from foreign law. Moreover, we will see why we can learn from
foreign law even when the problems are different.
II. COMPARISON AMONG CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS
In the mid-twentieth century, the idea that each nation's law
formed a "system" was widely accepted among comparative
lawyers, although they were unclear as to what a "system"' meant:
Did it mean rules that were logically coherent, or rules that
reflected a "national spirit" or common ideals, or rules that
reflected common methods and values? Many have dated the
emergence of comparative law to the work of these twentieth
century scholars who defined their task as the comparison of legal
"systems." 8 The archetypal work was by Rend David: Les Grands
Systbmes de Droit Contemporains.9 According to David, "[e]ach
law constitutes in fact a system: it employs a certain vocabulary,
corresponding to certain legal concepts; it uses certain methods to
interpret them; it is tied to a certain conception of social order
which determines the means of application and the function of
law."1 0
A kindred idea was that these systems were embodied in civil
codes. The code supposedly represented, not merely an enactment
of the legislature, but a logical and coherent response to whatever
legal problems had to be answered. This view prevailed in France
even though, as I have shown elsewhere, it was a nineteenth
century innovation very different from the view of the drafters.
I I
But it fit very well with the ideas that influenced the comparative
study of law in the mid-twentieth century. If each civil code
embodied a different systematic approach to law, then the job was
to study, not particular rules, but their place in the system.
8. Ren6 David & John E.C. Brierley, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 3 (2d
ed. 1978).
9. Ren6 David, LES GRANDS SYSTtMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS (7th
ed. 1978).
10. Id. at 20.
11. James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459
(1994).
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I am skeptical of this whole approach. The contents of the
German or French codes seem to me a collage of solutions, some
more coherent, some less, produced over the centuries and cobbled
together by committees of drafters subject to their own
idiosyncracies. As I said earlier, most of them address common
problems.
In any event, there is no way one can explain the protection of
honor, dignity, and reputation in France and Germany as elements
of a system enshrined in their codes.
The French Civil Code never mentions them. The Code simply
says, in articles 1382 and 1383, that anyone who causes another a
dommage-a harm---must pay if (as French commentators rightly
interpret these provisions) he has done so intentionally or
negligently. Admittedly, the drafters were familiar with the
Roman law of iniuria, which protected dignity. Yet, they never
discussed it so far as one can tell from Fenet's compilation of their
deliberations. Toullier 12 and Duranton, 13 the first commentators on
the Code, do not mention the protection of honor, dignity, or
reputation. They simply say that anyone who is at fault for actions
which are injurious or harmful to another must pay damages. In
their leading treatise, Aubry and Rau explained that "any right can
be the matter of a delict-it matters little that this right concerns an
external object, or one which is bound up (se confonde) with the
existence of the person to whom it belongs.' 14 In a footnote, they
added: "Consequently, for example, the honor and reputation of a
person can be the matter of a delict.' 15 Without much argument,
their position became standard among French commentators and
courts.
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Barde dissented later in the century,
although by then, as they acknowledged, the weight of authority
was against them. In part, they directed their attack, not only
against compensation for loss of dignity or reputation in particular,
but also against any compensation for dommage simplement
morale, or harm that was merely non-pecuniary and non-physical.
The role of pecuniary damages, they claimed, can only be to
"reestablish the wealth [patrimoine] of the person who obtains
them by the amount by which this wealth was unjustly
diminished." But even if the plaintiff should recover for non-
12. Charles Toullier, 11 LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU
CODE No. 117 (4th ed. 1824).
13. Alexandre Duranton, 13 COURS DE DRorr FRANi2AIS SUIVANT LE CODE
CIVIL Nos. 704-08 (3d ed. 1834).
14. Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, 4 COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQ2AIs No.
444 (4th ed. 1869).
15. Id. at n.4.
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pecuniary harm, he should not recover for affronts to his honor,
dignity, or reputation. "It is scandalous that one can regard, as a
matter of justice, the most sacred affections [and] the sufferings
most worthy of respect."' 6  One cannot say, then, that the
protection of dignity, which the Code never mentions, is in some
way part of a "system" embodied in the Code and intelligible in
terms of its other provisions.
This account of nineteenth century French law is much
different than the one given by James Whitman in his article, "The
Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty."' 7 In
his story, in earlier centuries when societies were "sharply
hierarchical," "only persons of high social status could expect their
right to respect to be protected in court. Indeed, well into the
twentieth century... only high status persons could expect their
'personal honor' to be protected in continental courts."' 8  The
honor of low status persons was protected on the Continent due to
a process of "leveling up," which occurred in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries: that is, they were accorded the respect
previously accorded only to high status persons.'
9
Here we must be clear about the issue we are discussing.
Whitman may be perfectly right that in France and other European
countries there has been a "leveling up" in which ordinary people
are treated with a respect once reserved for the upper class, while
in the United States, there has been a "leveling down" in which
everyone is treated as ordinary people once were. I have thought
about that remark while living in Europe following rules of
etiquette unknown in California, where while eating at a premier
restaurant, the waiter felt it acceptable to slap me on the back and
say, "Hang in there, big guy." Whitman is certainly right that at
one time lower class people would not have had their rights
protected in court. Even Voltaire, when he was beaten by the
servants of a nobleman he had offended, found that his nobly-born
friends would not help him find redress.
Those observations are an important contribution to
understanding the way law impacted society. But they should not
be confused with a description of how the law supposedly in force
changed. It was against the law in Voltaire's time to beat people
up, just as it was against the law in the post-bellum South to lynch
16. Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie & Louis Barde, 4 TRAITt THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS No. 2871 (3d ed. 1908).
17. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy. Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
18. Id. at 1165.
19. Id. at 1166.
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black people. Those things happened, and it matters that they did.
But the question I am asking is at what point did French law
formally protect the honor, dignity, and reputation, even of lower
class people? And the answer is: not only during the nineteenth
century, but well before. We will see in the next section that this
protection was formally accorded even to persons of humble status
by the Roman action for iniuria, which had been accepted for
centuries in France and Germany. As we have just seen, whatever
may have happened in 1791, the drafters of the French Civil Code
neither mentioned nor discussed such a right. When nineteenth
century jurists first considered the matter, they deemed the
violation of such a right a dommage for which one could recover
under articles 1382 and 1383. They drew no distinctions as to the
social class of the plaintiff. When opposition emerged, it was later,
and on the ground just described: that money could not compensate
for the loss of honor, and it was squalid for the plaintiff to ask for
compensation. That argument was rejected by most jurists.
Whitman's story is not concerned with when French law formally
protected the honor and dignity of lower class people. It concerns
the importance attached to the protection of honor in French
society. He begins by speaking of enthusiasm for the protection of
everyone's honor manifested at the time of the French Constitution
of 1791. He describes a series of dramatic cases involving honor
and reputation, and sometimes property, that arose in the
nineteenth century. 20 But that seems to describe how honor was
regarded, not the point at which its protection was formally
recognized as a legal right.
It would be even harder to describe German law in terms of a
system enshrined in the German Civil Code. As just mentioned,
there was a Roman civil action protecting dignity--action for
iniuria-which had been recognized since Roman law had been
received in Germany in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries. In 1872, however, the Criminal Code of the newly
unified German state provided a criminal sanction for attacks on
honor and reputation. As part of the criminal action, compensation
could be awarded to the victim, but only for pecuniary damage.
21
One purpose of the new provisions of the Criminal Code was
to abolish an older remedy: a court order requiring the defendant to
retract his statement or apologize for having made it. Jurists
pointed out that it might be difficult to compel the defendant to do
20. Id. at 1174-80.
21. Strafgesetzbuch § 188 (repealed).
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so, and compelling him might do little to ameliorate the situation
of the plaintiff.
22
That left open the question whether, once the Criminal Code
was in place, a plaintiff could only recover if he had suffered
pecuniary damages as specified in the Code, or whether he could
still bring a civil action for iniuria for monetary compensation for
a loss of dignity or reputation. German jurists argued over that
question.
2 3
During that argument, some jurists made the same claim that
Bauderie-Lacaninerie and Barde had made in France. A loss of
honor andz&ood reputation could not be made good by the payment
of money. It was squalid even to seek compensation for a loss of
this kind. Consequently, Hartmann claimed that French law was
"absolutely foreign" to the "feelings of the German people." "It
contradicts the deepest German sensibilities to measure the most
sacred feelings in base mammon and to compensate every
violation of those feelings with a monetary payment."
25
The drafters of the first version of the German Civil Code, like
the majority of French jurists, disagreed. Their draft provided, in a
provision which was the ancestor of what is now § 823, that a
plaintiff could recover damages for injury to his "honor" (Ehre)
just as he could for injury to other enumerated rights such as life,
health, freedom (meaning freedom of movement), and property.
Proponents of this position argued that it was necessary to fill the
gaps left by the German Criminal Code.
While the argument continued, a majority of the committee that
produced the final draft disagreed. According to the official report
of the debates:
The majority, on the contrary, was of the view that the
practical result would be that through this proposal all the
inconveniences would be reintroduced against which the
statute on the abolition of the actio iniuriarum had been
aimed. If the main purpose is not the procurement of a
payment of damages but the restoration of honor, one
would be drawn to the conclusion that a declaration
22. Reinhard Zimmermann, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 1090 (1990).
23. For example, there was no civil action according to Aloys Brinz &
Philipp Lotmar, 2 LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTEN § 338 (2d ed. 1879). There was a
civil action according to Heinrich Dernburg, 2 PANDEKTEN § 137 (4th ed. 1894).
24. Zimmermann, supra note 22, at 1090-92.
25. G. Hartmann, Der Civilgesetzenentwurf das Aequitatsprincip und die
Richterstellung, 73 ARCH. CIv. PRAXIS 309, 364 (1888).
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concerning one's honor, a retraction, or an apology would
have to be made.
26
The argument, then, was that if one wished to protect honor,
one would have to do so by means of a remedy that had already
been legislatively rejected: a court-compelled retraction or
apology. A payment of money would not accomplish that
objective. The reason, presumably, was either that money could
not restore honor, or that it was squalid to ask for money when
one's honor was offended.
At any rate, the final version of the German Civil Code made it
as clear as possible that one could not recover damages for a loss
of dignity or reputation except in certain special cases, such as
when one's credit was hurt. Section 823(1) says that the plaintiff
can only recover for injury to the "life, body, health, freedom,
ownership or similar right [sonstiges Recht] of another." Injury to
"honor" (Ehre) had been deleted from the original version of this
provision and was not supposed to be included as a sonstiges
Recht. Section 823(2) says that the obligation to make
compensation also rests "on a person who infringes a statute
intended for the protection of others." As we have just seen,
people are protected against defamation and insult by the German
Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). But to prevent them from
recovering damages in tort, the drafters added in § 253: "In the
case of harm that is not economic, compensation in money can be
demanded only in the cases specified by statute." The Criminal
Code provided for recovery only for pecuniary loss, and the Civil
Code provided for "fair compensation in money for non-economic
harm" only "in the case of injury to body or health or in the case of
deprivation of liberty.,
27
So it remained until the highest German court for civil cases,
the Bundesgerichtshof chose to overturn the provisions of the
Civil Code by invoking the post-war German Constitution
(Grundgesetz). The Constitution provided in Article 1(1): "The
worth of a human being is unassailable. It is the duty of all state
power to attend to it and protect it." It provided in Article 2(1):
"Each person has the right to the free development of his
personality [Persdnlichkeit] insofar as he does not injure the rights
of others and does not violate the constitutional order or moral
law." The Bundesgerichtshof held that these constitutional rights
would lack adequate protection if a plaintiff could recover only if
26. PROTOKOLLE DER KoMMIsSION FOR DIE ZWEITE LESUNG DES ENTWURFS
DES BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS 641 (1898).
27. Buindesgesetzbuch § 847, 1.
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he had suffered pecuniary loss. To that end, in 1954, the Court
declared that a plaintiff could recover damages for violation of his
Persdnlichkeit-his "personality"--which it construed to encompass
honor, dignity, and reputation. It recognized Persdnlichkeit as a
"similar right" within the meaning of § 823(1) of the German Civil
Code even though the drafters had been perfectly clear that it was
not. The Court held that a newspaper had violated a person's right
by attributing a position to him that was not his own but had been
represented as such by his lawyer.
28
The Court's argument was that the provisions of the Civil Code
must be trumped because of the importance of honor, dignity, and
reputation in the new democratic constitution. Like James
Whitman, I find it hard to take that argument seriously. But again,
he and I tell a different story. His is the story of nineteenth century
German thinkers who considered the protection of honor and
dignity in terms of "philosophical ideas that are both vague and
grandiose, and are not obviously easy to translate into law."
29
Confronted with that difficult, German jurists turned instead to
the Roman action for iniuria. But their work was shaped as well
by that of the philosophers, in particular, those in the Hegelian
tradition.
3
'
Again, our accounts may differ because we are asking different
questions. Whitman describes how German intellectuals regarded
the protection of honor and dignity. I am concerned with what the
law was. I do not see any Hegelian influence on the German
jurists of the Pandektenschule who discussed the action for iniuria.
Nor do I see much of German philosophy in the arguments that
inspired the limitations of the Criminal Code, the debate as to how
far it changed civil law, the decision of the first drafting committee
to protect honor in the Civil Code, or the final decision not to
protect it. Those who drafted the Criminal Code thought honor
should not and could not be protected by a judicially compelled
retraction or apology. Those who drafted the final version of the
Civil Code thought it could not be protected by awarding damages,
and, in any case, it would be squalid for the plaintiff to ask for
them. Nor do I see a gradually increasing respect, so far as the law
was concerned, for the honor of persons of lower status. The
Criminal Code granted protection to persons of lower status. The
Civil Code denied it to persons of higher status. And the reason
was not that honor was deemed of less importance in 1900 when
28. Bundesgerichtshof, 25 May 1954, BGHZ 13, 334.
29. Whitman, supra note 17, at 1182.
30. Id. at 1183.
31. Id. at 1183-84.
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the Code was enacted than in 1954 when the Bundesgerichtshof
intervened. It was that the Bundesgerichtshof was willing to trump
the decision of the drafters of the Code as to how honor should be
protected. The point on which Whitman and I do agree is that the
decision to override the Code had nothing to do with a new respect
for honor inspired by the democratic constitution.
In any event, German law became much like the law of France.
There is a uniform action for damages in tort that protects, not only
property and person, but a collage of interests which the French
describe as dommage morale, which includes the right to a private
life; there is a similar action in Germany to protect the right to
Persdnlichkeit. Whatever else these rights include, they
encompass protection of one's dignity and reputation, sometimes
even if the defendant has lost his reputation because the plaintiff
told the truth about him.
Here, the important point is not that the French and Germans
now protect honor, dignity, and reputation in much the same way.
From 1900 until 1954, the Germans did not protect them by an
action for damages, while the French had done so since the early
nineteenth century. Rather, the important point is that the reason
for the earlier difference and the present similarity is not to be
found in a systematic view of law embodied in the French and
German Codes or a new view of human worth embodied in the
present German Constitution. Honor, dignity, and reputation were
always valued. The question was whether a damage award could
compensate for their loss, and whether it would be squalid for the
plaintiff to seek one. It just happened that the question was
answered one way by a majority of French jurists and the first
German drafting committee, and the other way by a minority of
French jurists and a majority of the second German drafting
committee. Since the value of honor, dignity, and reputation was
never called into question, the protection accorded by German law
since 1954 really reflects a disagreement with the drafters of the
Code over whether an action for damages is appropriate-the
question that French and Germans had argued over since the
nineteenth century.
The argument is now over. Both the French and the Germans
seem well pleased with the protection their law affords. But it
should have been an international argument. Jurists of both
countries were confronting precisely the same problem. Hartman
should have been reading the French jurists, not dismissing anything
they had to say as reflecting non-German values. The German
drafters should have given weight to how the problem had been
resolved in France. Had they done so, they might have reached a
different conclusion, one which would not be overruled a half
[Vol. 671082
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century later by the Bundesgerichtshof The Bundesgerichtshof
should have understood the argument that had influenced the
drafters. It might then have written an opinion that would be more
honest and more useful. It would have been more honest because it
would have acknowledged that it was disagreeing with the drafters,
not on the importance of honor, dignity, and reputation, but on how
they should be protected. It would have been more useful because it
would have laid the groundwork for a discussion that I have argued
is long overdue: the respect owed to a provision inserted in a code
because it happened to appeal to the majority of a drafting
committee a century ago.
32
III. COMPARISON AMONG COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS
Civil law and common law protected honor, dignity, and
reputation quite differently. Could it not be that this historical
difference cast a shadow over later law, whether or not this
difference was embodied in the French and German codes? Or
that this difference is reflected in traditions that are still alive? If
so, again, we might expect that common and civil lawyers can
learn little from each other. American and English lawyers might
simply not be facing the same problem as those in France and
Germany.
The history was indeed different. It does explain why Anglo-
American and Continental jurists in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries approached the problem from different starting points.
But it does not explain the ending points in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries. Indeed, the English in particular are now
facing many of the same problems as the French and Germans.
A. Starting Points
Before codification, Continental countries that adopted Roman
law, or, as in northern France, Roman tort law, recognized a
Roman law action to protect people against offenses to honor,
dignity, and reputation: the action of iniuria. English law did not.
It recognized a patchwork of forms of action, none of which
directly addressed the protection of honor and dignity. It
recognized actions in slander and libel to protect reputation, but
these were qualified by myriad technical rules unknown on the
Continent.
32. James Gordley, The Future of European Contract Law on the Basis of
Europe's Heritage, I EUR. REV. CONT. L. 163 (2005).
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
1. Civil Law
According to the Roman sources, the plaintiff could recover for
iniuria if the defendant beat the plaintiffs slave33 or entered his
house without permission. 34 He could recover if someone attacked
him by composing or reciting a song,35 or by assembling people at
his house to raise a loud and offensive clamor.36 The defendant
was liable for iniuria if he "accosted" a woman, which meant,
according to the jurist Ulpian, that he used "smooth words to make
at attempt upon [her] virtue., 37 He was also liable for using base
language 38 or for following a woman "assiduously. 3 9 He was
liable for maligning the defendant for example, by presenting a
petition about him to the emperor. Initially, whether truth was a
defense was not so clear. Nevertheless, despite a Roman text
seemingly to the contrary, 4 1 most Continental jurists concluded it
was actionable to tell an unpleasant truth about someone else
unless the public interest required it.
42
In the eighteenth century, Continental jurists were still
discussing the limits of iniuria in a similar way: by itemizing cases
in which an action would lie. Reinhard Zimmermann gives some
examples from eighteenth century Germany:
It could be injurious to taunt his person with his natural
impediment by calling him a cripple, or a hunchback. To
refer to someone, ironically, as a "bonus patiens vir" (and
thus suggesting that he was a cuckold), to state
emphatically "ego saltem scortator non sum" (and thus
insinuate that a particular other person is a fornicator), to
use obscene language, particularly in the presence of a
virgo, to address a clergyman "du pfaff," or to use the
familiar "du" when talking German to persona honorabilis.
These are all cases of verbal injuries. Pulling faces, putting
33. DIG. 47.10.15.34.
34. Id. at 47.2.21.7.
35. Id. at 47.10.15.27.
36. Id. at 47.10.15.2.
37. Id. at 47.10.15.20.
38. Id. at47.10.15.21.
39. Id. at 47.10.15.22.
40. Id. at 47.10.15.29.
41. Id. at 47.10.18 pr. ("It would not be fair [bonum aequum] for one who
defames a pernicious person to be condemned, for the wrongs of such a person
ought to be observed and made known.").
42. Gordley, supra note 1, at 218, 243-44.
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out one's tongue at another or kissing a woman against her
will are examples of iniuriae reales.
4
w
These societies were, of course, hierarchical. To an extent, that
was reflected in the conduct that was considered insulting, as in the
passage just quoted, in which it was an insult for a lower class
person to use the familiar pronoun "du" when speaking to persona
honorabilis. Moreover, it may have been impossible as a practical
matter for a lower class person to obtain redress in the courts. But
that does not mean that by law, the honor of humble persons was
not protected. On that point, again, I differ from Whitman.
Althouh one Roman text said that no iniuria could be suffered by
a slave, another said that "iniuria to the slave should not be left
unavenged by the praetor, especially if it occurred by beating or
torture, for it is obvious that the slave himself feels these things.
45
Medieval jurists agreed that the slave could be the victim of iniuria
although they differed as to the protection the law afforded him.46
From the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, jurists sometimes
included cases in which the victims lack social status. According
to Accursius, not only is it iniuria to try to make a chaste woman
unchaste, as a Roman text said,47 but also to try to make an
unchaste woman still less so.4 s To judge from the texts he cited, he
also had in mind the relatively unchaste of the lower classes.49
Bartolus included the case of a land owner who caught a rustic
fellow in his vineyard and beat him. Bartolus took it for granted
that the rustic could normally recover for iniuria and asked
whether he could still recover if he had previously agreed that the
vineyard owner could beat him if he were found there. He could,
according to Bartolus, because such an agreement "contains
something immoral [turpe], namely, that the owner could commit a
43. Zimmermann, supra note 22, at 1065-66 (footnotes omitted).
44. J. INST. 4.4.3.
45. DIG. 47.10.15.35. According to another text, one may not do iniuria to
another person's slave. CODE JUST. 9.35.1. The point of this last text, according
to Cinus, was that "because a slave is considered as nothing [Quia servi nihil
esse putanter] there was doubt as to whether he could suffer or commit iniuiria,
which is removed by this law." Cinus de Pistoia, In Codicem Commentaria to
CODE JUST. 9.35.1 (1578).
46. It was not clear whether the slave had an action in his own name.
Nevertheless, Accursius, one of the greatest jurists of the thirteenth century,
concluded that he did as a matter of natural law, whatever the civil law might be.
Glossa Ordinaria to J. INST. 1.4.3.
47. DIG.47.10.10.
48. Glossa Ordinaria to DIG. 47.10.10.
49. DIG. 11.3.1, which says that to corrupt a slave is to make a good slave
bad or a bad one worse.
6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
wrongful act." 50 Sixteenth century examples of iniuria included
maligning the skill of carpenters or the private lives of seemingly
pious humble women (mulierculae) who live on alms. 52  A
prostitute could not complain if someone said she admitted a man
at night, but that was because she habitually did so, and so had no
reputation to lose.53 Children and madmen could recover for
iniuria, and the jurists do not suggest that they must be upper class
children or madmen.
54
In any event, a change in how the action was conceived began
in the sixteenth century. The Roman jurists and medieval civilians,
for all their subtlety, were not philosophers. They discussed
iniuria without trying to define the rights protected. In the
sixteenth century, a group known to historians as the "late
scholastics" tried to systematize Roman law, organizing it into
doctrines and explaining the doctrines by philosophical principles.
The principles were those of their intellectual heroes, Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle had said that distributive justice entitles
each citizen to a fair share of "honor or wealth, or anything else that
can be divided amongst members of a community who share in a
political system. . . ." Commutative justice preserves that share. If
one citizen is involuntarily deprived of resources by another,
commutative justice requires the person who did so to compensate
the victim.55 The late scholastics concluded that the action for
iniuria was only an instance of this principle. One person had
deprived another of honor and so must make it up. Another
instance was the Roman lex Aquilia, which entitled one to
compensation when his property or (as medieval jurists interpreted
it) his person had been harmed by another's fault. In theory then,
there was a unified action in tort, based on fault, protecting
whatever belonged to the plaintiff including his honor, and based
on the Aristotelian concept of commutative justice.
This general principle, shorn of its Aristotelian terminology,
was accepted by Hugo Grotius, the influential seventeenth century
50. Bartolus de Saxoferrato, COMMENTARIA CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS to DIG.
47.10.1.5 No. 3 (1615).
51. Martinus Azpilcueta, COMMENTARIA DE DETRACTIONE, FAMA ET Eius
RESTITUTIONE Nos. 458-59, f. 8r (1594).
52. Domenicus de Soto, De IUSTITIAETIURE LIBRI DECEM lib. 5, Q. 10, a. 2
(1553).
53. Id. at lib. 4, Q. 6, a. 3.
54. Azpilcueta, supra note 51, at No. 466, f. 9r; lohannes Brunnemann,
COMMENTARIA IN QUINQUAGINTA LIBROS PANDECTARUM to DIG. 47.10.3
(1762); Wolfgang Lauterbach, COLLEGIi THEORETICO-PRACTICI to DIG. 47.10 §
1, VIII (1793).
55. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS vii, at 1130(b)-i 131(a).
1086 [Vol. 67
2007] PRIVACYIN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1087
jurist who founded the so-called Northern Natural Law School. He
said:
[F]rom... a fault, if damage is caused, an obligation arises
by the law of nature, namely that the damage should be
made good .... Damage ... is when a man has less than
what is his .... Things which a man may regard as his by
nature are life, not indeed to throw away but to keep, his
body, limbs, fame, honor, his own acts.
56
This general principle was borrowed by the French jurist
Robert Pothier,57 whence it passed into articles 1382 and 1383 of
the French Civil Code, although, as we have seen, without
mentioning specific types of damage. It passed into the German
Civil Code where, as we have already described, the drafters
decided that offense to honor was not among the harms against
which one should be protected.
In Continental history, then, there had been since Roman times
a tradition of protecting honor, dignity, and reputation by a distinct
action for iniuria. Since the sixteenth century, there had been a
tradition of assimilating this protection to that of other rights such
as person and property. Culpable violation of them called for
compensation.
2. Common Law
Traditionally, English common law was entirely different. The
law was not organized around concepts like tort, let alone
commutative justice, but around writs or forms of action. Absent
an applicable writ, the plaintiff, however meritorious his case,
could not recover before the royal courts. Much judge-made and
unsystematized lore grew up concerning when each writ would lie,
but it was not the product of systematic thought. The writs were
not a list of rights deemed worthy of protection; they were a list of
actions that had traditionally been allowed before the common law
courts.
Unlike the Roman action for iniuria, none of these writs
squarely addressed the general problem of protecting honor and
dignity.
It is true that, traditionally, the plaintiff could sue for assault
and battery for physical contact even if it did not result in harm.
Such conduct could often be insulting. Sometimes courts said they
56. Hugo Grotius, DE luRE BELLI AC PAMS L1BB RI Tres 1-2 (1646).
57. Robert Pothier, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS Nos. 116, 118 (1761).
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were protecting the plaintiff against insult. A judge did so in an
eighteenth century American case:
[T]he insult is more to be considered than the actual
damage; for, though no great bodily pain is suffered by a
blow on the palm of a hand, or the skirt of a coat, yet these
are clearly within the legal definition of Assault and
Battery, and among gentlemen, too often induce dueling,
and terminate in murder.
58
Nevertheless, it was a long time before protection against insult
or offensive conduct became the standard explanation of liability.
Hilliard in 1861 spoke of "an angry, rude, insolent or revengeful
touching, , 59 Addison in 1876 of touching "in a rude or violent
manner 5760 and Burdick in 1908 of the "touching of another in
anger. None of them mentioned offense or insult expressly. In
1926, Clark said that the defendant was liable because of "the very
great importance attached by the law to the interest of personal
security. ' '62 Seavy said in 1942 that a "very slight interference is
sufficient" because the interest "in bodily integrity" is one of the
"most highly protected., 63 But Salmond in 1916, Harper in 1933,
and Prosser in 1941 gave a different reason: the law was protecting
the defendant against "insult" or "offensive touching."'64 Their
view became orthodox. It passed into the First and Second
58. Republica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 114 (1784) (holding the
defendant liable for striking the cane of the French ambassador; although the
court claimed to apply the law of nations, it was clearly thinking in terms of the
common law action of assault and battery).
59. Francis Hilliard, 1 THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 201 (2d ed.
1861). See Francis M. Burdick, THE LAW OF TORTS: A CONCISE TREATISE ON
THE CIVIL LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER MODERN STATUTES FOR
ACTIONABLE WRONGS TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 268 (2d ed. 1908) ("touching
of another in anger") (quoting Cole v. Turner, (1704) 6 Mod. 149, 87 Eng. Rep.
907); Thomas M. Cooley, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 162 (1880) ("Injury... done ... in
an angry or revengeful or rude or insolent matter").
60. C.G. Addison, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 4 (C.G. Wood ed.,
1876).
61. Burdick, supra note 59.
62. George L. Clark, THE LAW OF TORTS 10 (1926).
63. Warren Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. REV. 72, 81 (1942).
64. Fowler Vincent Harper, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS: A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR HARMS TO LEGALLY
PROTECTED INTERESTS 38 (1933); William L. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 44-45 (1941); John W. Salmond, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON
THE ENGLISH LAW OF LIABILITY FOR CIVIL INJURIES 383 (4th ed. 1916).
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Restatement of Torts.65 As a leading English treatise puts it, "the
interest that is protected by the law of assault and battery is not
merely that of freedom from bodily harm, but also that of freedom
from such forms of insult as may be due to interference with his
person.
66
As to reputation, in the 1500s, English courts began to give an
action against one who made disparaging statements about another,
or rather two actions, slander for oral statements and libel for
written ones. Initially, actions for libel were brought before the
Court of Star Chamber where, as in Continental law, truth was not
67a defense. For reasons that are obscure, when the common law
courts took over cases of libel, they changed that rule. Truth was a
defense. The common law courts also developed a technical set of
rules governing the plaintiff's recovery. The defendant need not
be at fault. Fault, at the time, was not a basis for liability even in
cases of physical injury. But the harshness of that rule was
mitigated by placing a series of obstacles in the plaintiffs path.
Certain spoken words (cases of so-called slander per se) were
actionable without the need to prove damages: traditionally, those
claiming the plaintiff had a loathsome disease, or had committed a
crime, or which could injure him in his trade or profession. Libel
was actionable without proof of special damages, although there is
a long standing argument over whether this was so generally, or
only when the statement was defamatory on its face (so called libel
per se as distinguished from libel per quod).68 The courts then
recognized an elaborate series of privileges to protect defendants
who had made a statement, not officiously, but in circumstances
that served some interest deemed worthy of protection.
B. A Possible Ending Point
One cannot understand the current differences in the way civil
and common law jurisdictions protect honor, dignity, and
reputation without recognizing the difference in how they were
traditionally protected. But that is not to say we can explain the
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 2.1-2.2 (1976); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS §§ 2.1-2.2 (1934).
66. R.F.V. Heuston & R.A. Buckley, SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 133-34 (19th ed. 1987) (citing Collins v. Wilcock (1984) 1 W.L.R.
1172, 1177 (Q.B.)).
67. De Libelis Famosis, (1605) 77 Eng. Rep. 250.
68. Compare William Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839 (1960)
(plaintiff must prove special damages only in cases of libel per quod), with
Laurence W. Eldridge, The Spurious Role of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv.
733 (1966) (all libels actionable without proof of special damages).
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current differences by the historical ones. Quite contrary, I think
that if all that had been at stake was the protection of honor,
dignity, and reputation, civil and common law jurisdictions would
have arrived at much the same place, albeit by different routes.
That seems to be happening in England.
To accord the same sort of protection as Continental law,
Anglo-American lawyers would have to simplify the rules of
slander and libel. They are endeavoring to do so in ways that need
not be described here. More significantly, they would have to
supplement the traditional actions by others that protect the
plaintiffs honor and dignity even if his reputation has not been
compromised, and which protect his reputation even against a
truthful statement.
In England, that change is well underway. The extent to which
it has succeeded in the United States will be discussed in the next
section.
English courts are now protecting defendants against truthful
but derogatory statements b9 an action for breach of confidence.
In 1988, in Stevens v. Avery, the plaintiff had told another woman
about her own lesbian relationship with the victim of a murder.
That woman informed a newspaper, which published the story.
The plaintiff sued the woman she had informed as well as the
editor and publisher of the newspaper. The defendants argued that
an action for breach of confidence would lie only in the case of a
pre-existing relationship like that of an employer and employee, a
doctor and patient, or a priest and penitent. The court rejected that
argument and held the defendants liable because the information
had been received with the understanding it was to remain
confidential.
That limitation on the action was abandoned in 2004 in
Campbell v. MGN Ltd.70 Lord Nicholls claimed that in England
there is "no over-arching all-embracing cause of action for
'invasion of privacy."' But he said that the plaintiff could recover
even if information had been imparted to no one in confidence.
"The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as the misuse of
private information." The plaintiff, a celebrity, had sued a
newspaper that had described her narcotics addiction and published
pictures and descriptions of how she was being treated for it. She
did not recover, but primarily because she was a celebrity and had
lied to the public about her addiction. The court thought the
newspaper had the right to set the record straight.
69. [1988] 1 Ch. 449.
70. [2004] UKHL 22.
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After Campbell, however, what does matter is not an abuse of
confidence but rather, as in France and Germany, whether there
was a "misuse of private information." At that point, the problem
becomes the same in England as in France and Germany: what
information to consider private.
One can think of three potential stopping points. One might
think that the information or images disseminated must, as in
Campbell, lower the plaintiff in the esteem of others. If the
English stop there, then an action for "breach of confidence" will
be much like an action for slander or libel except that truth will not
be a defense and there will be no maze of special rules. But we do
not know that the English will stop there.
The Germans have gone further. A German statute provides
that one cannot use a person's picture unless the image depicts
contemporary history; is incidental to the portrayal of a landscape
gathering, or procession; or is of an important artistic nature.
7
What matters is that a person is portrayed without his consent, not
that he is disparaged, although in the cases just mentioned, that
right can be trumped.
Some French courts and the European Court of Human Rights
have gone still further. French decisions have held, for example,
that one cannot use a picture of a celebrity even if it was taken in a
public place and was not disparaging, unless the picture shows him
conducting his professional life. Thus, a newspaper was held
liable for publishing a photograph of a famous singer in a public
place accompanied by a woman without implying there was any
close personal relationship between them. In a similar case,
German courts reached a different conclusion. Princess Caroline
of Monoco sued when various German publishers printed pictures
of her in a secluded part of a restaurant with a well-known actor, in
public with her children, and in public on horseback, riding a
bicycle, skiing, and leaving a restaurant. The Bundesgerichtshof
held that she could not be shown in the secluded place. The
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held it
might also be improper to show her with her children. But to show
her in public engaged in ordinary activities, such as practicing
sports and leaving a restaurant, was permissible since she was a
figure of contemporary history. The European Court of Human
71. Kunsturhebergesetz [Law on the Rights of Authors to Works of Art and
Photography], Jan. 9, 1907 RGBI. 1, 7, §§ 22-23 (F.R.G.).
72. Cass., 2e ch. civ., 8 July 1981, arrt no. 1.013, pourvoi nos. 80-12.286,
80-13.079, translated in James Gordley & Arthur Taylor von Mehren, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW: READINGS,
CASES, MATERIALS 269-70 (2006).
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Rights, however, held that even these photographs could not be
published. They did not concern her public position and were of
no legitimate concern to the public.
7 3
Where to stop is not clear, although the problem of where to
stop is the same. It would be odd if the English tried to solve that
problem without looking to what the French, the Germans, and the
European Court of Human Rights have to say. Indeed, in his
opinion in Campbell,74 Lord Nicholls noted that England has
enacted a law forbidding public authority from violatin§ a right
protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. Article
5 of the Convention provides that "Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life." That was the provision
applied by the European Court of Human Rights in the case just
described. Lord Nicholls said that because of this enactment, the
European Convention must be taken into account in interpreting
English law. If that is so, the question of whether the English
should seek guidance from abroad, despite the differences in their
past, has been settled in the affirmative.
IV. COMPARING AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW
The same could have been said of the United States if all that
mattered had been the scope of the "right of privacy" recognized in
America in the twentieth century. While American courts would
not be bound to follow the European Convention on Human
Rights, the question of when to protect honor, dignity, and
reputation would be much the same as abroad.
The claim that American courts should protect a right to
privacy dates to a celebrated article written in 1890 by Warren and
76Brandeis. Warren's wife, a Boston society matron, had become
upset when a newspaper published the details of her daughter's
wedding. 77 Warren and Brandeis argued there should be an action
against those who disseminated private information of no concern
to the public.
American courts then recognized a right to privacy in quite
heterogenous cases. William Prosser claimed that, in effect, the
courts had recognized four distinct torts:
73. Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
74. Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22.
75. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (UK).
76. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv.
L. REv. 193 (1890).
77. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 407 (1960).
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Without any attempt to exact definition, these four torts
may be described as follows:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about
the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiffs name or likeness.7
8
Prosser described, accurately enough, four types of cases in
which American courts have given relief. A plaintiff had
recovered for intrusion into seclusion when the defendant used a
"hearing device" to listen in on her private conversations in her
own apartment. 79 A reformed prostitute80 and a reformed thief l
recovered for the disclosure of embarrassing private facts when
newspapers exposed their past lives. A plaintiff recovered for
having been placed in a false light when a magazine gave a
fictitious, though not derogatory, account of his experiences when
he and his family were held hostage by criminals. 82 Plaintiffs have
recovered for appropriation of their name or likeness when,
without their consent, their picture was used in advertisements83 or
their name was signed to a telegram urging veto of pending
legislation.
84
All four new torts were recognized in the Restatement of Torts
for which Prosser acted as Reporter. In drafting its provisions, he
confronted the problem as to where the line should be drawn: what
could a plaintiff legitimately regard as private? In the case of the
tort he had previously referred to as "disclosure of embarrassing
private facts," the Restatement broadened the grounds for
recovery. The facts revealed need not be embarrassing but must
merely concern the "private life of another." 85 That would protect
the type of privacy called for by Warren and Brandeis: nothing
embarrassing had happened at the wedding. The limit he imposed
on recovery for this tort as well as for intrusion into seclusion and
placing the plaintiff in a false light was that the act must be "highly
78. Id. at 389.
79. Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958).
80. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
81. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
82. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
83. Pavesich v. N. Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
84. Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976).
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offensive to a reasonable person." 86 Perhaps that language reflects
his own confusion about where the line should be drawn. Perhaps
it reflects his awareness that he was proposing formal recognition
of new torts, and must do so in a way that would cause the least
controversy.
In addition, the courts imposed another limit on recovery. An
official comment to the Restatement explained that in the case of
appropriation of another's name and image, "the rule stated is not
limited to commercial appropriation." It is enough if the defendant
uses it for "his own purposes and benefit."87  Yet, as Richard
Epstein has observed, "[t]he courts have uniformly held that the
right of publicity does not prevent newspapers from using
anyone's name or likeness in an ordinary news story." 88  For
example, a woman did not recover when the defendant published
her picture in a story called "After the Sexual Revolution" without
naming or commenting on her,8 9 nor did a couple who were in an
affectionate but not amorous pose when their picture was taken in
a public place and used in a human interest story.
90
These are not the same solutions as those we have seen in
foreign countries. They do show, however, that American courts,
like the English, were capable of breaking out of the confines set
by the traditional causes of action. Actions for slander and
defamation required that a statement be untrue and derogatory. To
allow recovery for the revelation of embarrassing private facts
eliminated the first of these requirements. To allow recovery for
putting plaintiff in a false light, derogatory or not, eliminated the
second. Moreover, while the solutions may be different, the
problem is the same as the one the Europeans have had to face.
Where should the line be drawn? What should a person have the
right to consider private? Had that been all that had happened,
Americans should be interested in how Europeans confront the
same problem. It is significant that James Whitman, who thinks,
as we will see, that American and European law differs because
Americans "have their own ... values," 91 does not think that in
these cases the values are different. He acknowledges the parallel
between the right to privacy, as we have just described it, and the
86. Id. (disclosure of private information); id. § 652B (intrusion into
seclusion); id. § 652E (false light).
87. Id. § 652C cmt. b.
88. Richard A. Epstein, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1186 (7th ed.
2000).
89. Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 400 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1980).
90. Gill v. Hearst Publ'n Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953).
91. Whitman, supra note 17, at 1211.
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Continental protection of honor, dignity, and reputation.92 He even
describes American protection of those rights as a "continental
transplant,, 93 although he cannot mean that Prosser, and the judges
whose decisions Prosser described, were consciously imitating
Continental law (although for all we know, Warren and Brandeis
may have been). In short, had nothing else happened, Americans
would be confronting the same problem as Europeans and
therefore should be interested in what Europeans have to say.
But that is not all that happened, and consequently, Whitman is
right that American law is different. American courts have
recognized a public right to disclosure that trumps private rights, a
right that goes far beyond the occasional remarks abroad about the
importance of freedom of expression. In Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell,94 the U.S. Supreme Court held Hustler Magazine had the
right to ridicule the Reverend Jerry Falwell grossly and obscenely.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,95 it held that a newspaper had
the right to reveal the name of a deceased rape victim that was
publicly disclosed in judicial9 6 proceedings. In Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court, it held that a newspaper could,
in defiance of a pre-trial order, publish the name and picture of an
eleven-year-old charged with delinquency by second degree
murder. The Court noted that no objection had been made to the
presence of the press in the courtroom.97 In Florida Star v.
B.J.F.,98 the Court held that a newspaper had the right to divulge
the name of a rape victim while her assailant was still at large,
even though the victim had given this information to the police,
who, seemingly by accident, had left it where reporters could find
it. None of these cases would have been decided the same way in
Europe.
At first glance, one might imagine that the reason for the
difference is that the U.S. Supreme Court has blinders on because
its most important duty is to interpret the Federal Constitution.
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but the
Constitution never mentions honor, dignity, and reputation or even,
like the German Constitution, the worth of a human being. One
might imagine that the Supreme Court is protecting the one value it
can see, given its institutional role. It does not have the
responsibility, as state courts do, of developing private law
92. Id. at 1202-03.
93. Id. at 1204.
94. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
95. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
96. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
97. Id. at 311.
98. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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coherently to safeguard other rights worthy of protection, such as
honor, dignity, and reputation. One cannot be certain how much
the nine members of the Supreme Court really know about private
law. Thus, one might imagine that, because of institutional
blindness, the Justices place a right they feel bound to safeguard
ahead of others whose importance they do not fully understand.
I do not think this is a good explanation. In other situations,
the Supreme Court has been ingenious at discovering and
protecting rights the Constitution never mentions, such as a right to
"privacy" that does not help the rape victim but does prohibit laws
against birth control and abortion. Had the Court so wished, it
could have found constitutional grounds for protecting "privacy" in
its normal sense.
Moreover, these differences in American law did not arise
simply because the Supreme Court decided to impose its opinion
on the states. One can see the same tendencies in state court
decisions. For example, simply as matter of common law and
leaving the Constitution aside, state courts held that newspapers
can intrude into what would otherwise be a right to privacy as long
as the matter is "newsworthy." They interpreted "newsworthiness"
so as to permit much more than Continental courts would tolerate.
It was "newsworthy" to describe the whereabouts and activities of
a one-time child prodigy who years before had dropped out of
public and academic life, become a recluse, and shunned
publicity.99 It was "newsworthy" to print pictures of a woman clad
only in a dishtowel who was escaping from her estranged husband
who had kidnapped her at gunpoint and forced her to disrobe. 00
As mentioned earlier, and in stark contrast to Germany and France,
American courts have uniformly held that a newspaper may use
anyone's name or likeness in an ordinary news story. That is so
even despite a comment in the Restatement that use of a name or
likeness is actionable provided it is to the defendant's "benefit or
advantage," whether or not it is to his commercial benefit. Those
cases were decided without invoking the Federal Constitution. But
some state courts have been willing to give the Constitution at least
as wide an interpretation as the Supreme Court. In Howell v. New
York Post Co.,"" a photojournalist trespassed on the grounds of a
private psychiatric facility and took a picture of the plaintiff
standing next to a woman who was the subject of the newspaper
article because she had attracted considerable attention in a child
99. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
100. Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
writ denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983).
101. 612N.E.2d699 (N.Y. 1993).
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abuse case and was now recovering. Learning that the plaintiff
was included in the picture and that the newspaper was planning to
publish it, the hospital's medical director telephoned and objected
that to do so would jeopardize the patient's recovery. Her
hospitalization had remained a secret from all but her immediate
family. The highest court in New York held that the newspaper
had a constitutional right to print the picture without even cropping
it to remove the image of the plaintiff. Had it done so, the court
said, "the visual impact would not have been the same . .. .
Whitman explains the difference by saying:
The correct concept of personhood is not what is at stake
here. What is at stake are two different core sets of values:
On the one hand, a European interest in personal dignity,
threatened primarily by the mass media; on the other hand,
an American interest in liberty, threatened primarily by the
government. 10
2
That statement can be only half true. As we have seen,
Whitman himself regards the right to privacy as recognized in
American tort law as protecting much the same right to personal
dignity as Continental law. So the reason for the difference is not
that the protection of personal dignity is a core value recognized in
Europe but not in the United States. The difference must be that in
addition, American law also recognizes some countervailing value,
strong enough often to trump the protection of dignity. Whitman
correctly identifies this value as "liberty" in the sense of freedom
of expression.
Freedom of expression can be valued for two reasons: either
because it protects the right of a person to dissent or otherwise
express himself, or because it protects the right of others to hear
what he has to say. In the cases described, courts must be
protecting freedom of expression for the second reason. It would
be odd to think a photographer's or journalist's interest in self-
expression is compromised because he cannot print a photograph
of an inmate in a mental institution or disclose the name of a rape
victim.
If that is so, we can interpret American protection of freedom
of expression in two ways. I will argue that in either case,
Americans can learn from European law. But there is a difference
in what they will learn.
By one interpretation, while Europeans and Americans both
value freedom of expression, American courts are engaged in what
religious Jews have described to me as "fencing the Torah."
102. Whitman, supra note 17, at 1219.
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Europeans are not. Fencing the Torah, as it has been explained to
me, means that since God made rules that man cannot fully
understand, doubts are to be resolved by interpreting the rules
strictly. If we are in doubt as to whether turning on an electric
light on the Sabbath is like making a fire, we should assume that it
is. By this interpretation, when an American court is in doubt as to
whether the right to free expression is infringed, it will not balance
the significance of the infringement against the harm done to the
plaintiff s dignity. It will protect freedom of expression.
According to this view, American law is not different because
Europeans and Americans value different kinds of freedom of
expression. It is because when doubts arise, Americans will
resolve them so as to protect freedom of expression.
That is the explanation the Supreme Court gave for its decision
in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. 1 03 The defendant published a
satire in which the Reverend Falwell claimed to have had his first
sexual experience in an outhouse with his mother. The Court
agreed that the publication was in extremely bad taste. But it
claimed that it could not distinguish it from the cartoons of
Thomas Nast, which were once influential in discrediting dishonest
politicians who belonged to the "Tweed Ring" in New York.
At first sight, that statement might seem as absurd as a claim
that one cannot distinguish the Venus de Milo from a Playboy
centerfold, or Michelangelo's David from a man exposing himself
on the street. In my view, however, the Court had a legitimate
point. The portrayal of Falwell did offend Protestants. Catholics
were offended by the cartoons Nast drew of Catholic politicians
kissing the Pope's foot. When one reads the invective-much of it
in bad taste, much of it unfair-that has marked American election
campaigns, political discussions, and protests throughout history,
one can see why a court would not try to draw lines.
But if that is the goal, then it seems that the Europeans have
much to learn from the Americans, and the Americans from the
Europeans. In one German case, a newspaper was held liable for
calling the German army a "murder machine." According to the
Bundesgerichtshof "the defendant is free to discuss critically the
celebration of the oath of the German army and in so doing he may
use sharp and polemical expressions and overstated poster-like
value judgments but nevertheless that does not justify vituperation,
abuse and defaming as is the case here."' 0 4 The Court seems to
have an excessive confidence in its own ability to tell the
difference between overstated poster-like value judgments and
103. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
104. Bundesgerichtshof, 19 Jan. 1989, JZ 1989, 644.
1098 [Vol. 67
2007] PRIVACYIN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1099
vituperation. It might be better not to try. In a later case, the
German Constitutional Court reached the opposite result on similar
facts. 0 5  The defendant displayed a bumper sticker that read
"Soldiers are Murderers." The Court said that one could read the
word "murderer" to mean, not one who commits murder within the
meaning of the criminal law, but "as any killing of a person which
is unjustified and accordingly to be disapproved . . . ." Thus, it
turns out that one must not only distinguish "overstated poster-like
value judgments" from "vituperation." One must also distinguish
mere vituperation from social criticism, even though the same
words might be read either way. The problem is illustrated by
another German case in which a female prisoner had her sentence
lengthened for violating the dignity of her guards, inter alia, by
calling them "shit bulls" (Scheissbullen).1' The court of first
instance (Landgericht) held that this was not an insult, for one
could read her statement as a criticism of German prison
conditions and the guards' role in maintaining them. Had she said,
as a more cultivated person might, that conditions were bad and
they were in part responsible, her freedom of expression would be
protected. Could that not be what she meant by calling them "shit
bulls?" The intermediate appellate court (Oberlandesgericht)
overturned that decision. It said the words must be read as abuse of
the guards and not "simply as an expression of dissatisfaction ......
Thus German courts seem excessively confident about their ability
to distinguish mere abuse from social criticism. Perhaps when
lines are so subtle and hard to draw, they ought not to try. That
was the point the U.S. Supreme Court made in Falwell.
On the other hand, if what really is at stake is the difficulty of
drawing lines, then Americans have a great deal to learn from
Europeans. Before a court refuses to protect honor, dignity, or
reputation, the line ought to be at least one that is difficult to draw.
Turning on a light on the Sabbath bears some resemblance to
making a fire, but stepping into the sunshine to read a book does
not. European courts say that they are protecting the public's right
to know about matters of legitimate public concern. The character
of politicians and of public figures like Falwell is of legitimate
public concern. But why should the public be concerned about the
name of an eleven-year-old accused of a crime, the habits of a
recluse, the background of reformed prostitutes and thieves, or the
identity of a rape victim? How is the public enlightened by seeing
a picture of a woman escaping clad only in a dishtowel or by the
"visual impact" of a person of no public importance recovering in
105. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 28 Aug. 1994, NJW 1994, 2943.
106. Oberlandesgericht, Oldenburg, 31 July 1989, JR 1990, 1217.
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a mental hospital? If the American courts are worried about the
difficulty of drawing lines in ambiguous situations, then they
should ask whether the situation is indeed an ambiguous one in
which lines are hard to draw. In the cases just mentioned, it is hard
to see any way in which the people's understanding of public
issues or issues of concern to themselves could be advanced.
To explain these decisions, one would have to say the problem
is not simply one of drawing lines, a problem that Europeans and
Americans would both face if their courts were trying to protect
freedom of expression in the same sense. One would have to say
that Europeans are protecting freedom of expression in a different
sense. The question European courts ask is the one just stated:
Does the statement or image in question contribute to people's
understanding of public issues or issues of concern to themselves?
When that question can be answered in the affirmative, they are
willing to allow publication of material that they would otherwise
forbid. For example, when the author of a history of the German
occupation of the Franche Compte named the mistress of a
collaborator, the highest French court upheld his right to do so,
although it would not have done so had the name been mentioned
in the popular press rather than a work of history.10 7 Similarly, the
highest French court held a popular magazine liable for publishing
"numerous details relative to the private life of [Charles] Chaplin
and his family," although it would not have done so had the same
facts appeared in an historical study. 10 8 It noted that the defendant
"has never claimed ...the character of a scientific and critical
publication and did not present the article as an historical study."
Again, while German courts normally do not allow the press to
disclose a person's past criminal record, they did in the case of a
Nazi who allowed children to be deported to a concentration camp
for medical experiments. The court said: "In informing,
instructing and supporting the shaping of public opinion, the press
has a legitimate interest in reporting concretely the facts that are
essential for evaluating a former period of time .... 109
Some American courts have also paid attention to whether a
disclosure contributes to knowledge of a matter of public
importance. In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co.,' 10 a newspaper
had disclosed that the plaintiff was a homosexual. He had drawn
107. Cass., Ie ch. civ., 20 Nov. 1990, arrt no. 1492, pourvoi no. 89-12.580,
translated in Gordley & von Mehren, supra note 72, at 294.
108. Cass., 2' ch. civ., 14 Nov. 1975, arret no. 729, pourvoi no. 74-11.278,
translated in Gordley & von Mehren, supra note 72, at 291.
109. Oberlandesgericht, Frankfort, 6 Sept. 1979, NJW 1980, 597.
110. 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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national attention when he struck the arm of a would-be assassin
who had attempted to shoot President Gerald Ford, possibly saving
the President's life. In denying recovery, the court held the
disclosure was "newsworthy" because it did educate people as to a
matter of public importance. It discredited the stereotype of
homosexual men as lacking in courage. In contrast, in another
California case, Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, I"' a newspaper was held
liable for disclosing that the plaintiff was a transsexual. The
disclosure was not newsworthy because of its lack of "social
value." The article was not meant to educate the public about
transsexuality, and it contained a snide remark about how the
women at the plaintiff's high school might want to make other
shower arrangements. In another case, Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf
Inc.,1 2 Judge Posner took the question of educational value
seriously. The plaintiffs identity and past history of drunkenness
and adultery had been described in a serious study of the
experience of African-Americans moving north between 1940 and
1970. The author described their experience by telling the story of
individual families. The information about the plaintiff had been
given to him by the plaintiffs ex-wife. In denying recovery,
Posner stressed that "[n]o detail of the book ... is not germane to
the story that the author wanted to tell, a story not only of
legitimate but of transcendent public interest." He noted that
merely using fictitious names would not protect the identity of the
plaintiff unless the author also changed the details. But "then he
would no longer have been writing history. He would have been
writing fiction." In these cases, American courts seem to be
protecting the same type of freedom of expression as the
Europeans. What matters is whether the disclosure educates or
informs people of matters of public interest or importance to their
own affairs.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, many American courts have
protected freedom of expression in a different sense. The interest
protected is the public's right to know about matters of no concern
to themselves. Thus we have finally come to an instance in which
the problems that these American courts and the European courts
are addressing are not the same, since the problem of how to
protect one sort of freedom of expression is not the same as how to
protect the other.
If that is so, American courts can still learn from foreign law,
but the lesson is considerably different. By looking at foreign law,
these courts can learn that freedom of expression can have more
111. 139 Cal. App. 3d 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
112. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
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than one meaning: that one can protect one kind of freedom of
expression without protecting the other. They will no longer
imagine that decisions follow from some abstract unitary principle
about freedom of speech and the press.
Having done so, they can then ask whether the sort of freedom
of expression that they protect, and European courts do not, should
really be protected. Suppose one thought it should be. The
argument would have to be that rights to honor, dignity, and
reputation, which would otherwise be respected, should be
sacrificed because the people find it gratifying to know the name
of a rape victim or the identity of an eleven-year-old defendant, to
experience the "visual impact" of a picture of a recovering
celebrity surrounded by friends, or to see a woman escaping
captivity clad only in a dishtowel. It would have to be argued that
people's gratification in learning about such matters should trump
the rights that could otherwise be asserted by the rape victim who
incidentally changed her residence to avoid a series of harassing
phone calls; by the eleven-year-old whose record is now in a
newspaper database open to public access instead of sealed in court
records; by the mental patient whose recovery was jeopardized;
and by the woman who did not want public distribution of a
photograph in which she was largely naked. The reason for
trumping these rights would not be to inform or educate people or
to help them to live their lives. The reason would be that people
find such matters interesting.
Few people and few courts would find that argument
persuasive. The decisions just mentioned seem to be the result of a
failure to distinguish different kinds of freedom of expression, and,
consequently, to distinguish the reasons each might be worthy of
protection. If the study of foreign law can teach us to draw these
distinctions, it can teach us a valuable but different lesson. The
lesson is that we are wrong.
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